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ABSTRACT

Palenchar and Heath (2006) claim that, “organizations find reason to
implement programs whereby they increase the public’s understanding of
technical processes as a means for lessening the fear of the threatening
unknown and of increasing trust.” The research being proposed will hold the
British Petroleum Company (BP) to these standards as they relate to
communicating emanating from BP before, during, and after the Deepwater
Horizon disaster of 2010.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

On April 20th, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig, whose
furthest extremities stretched the length of fourteen Empire State buildings,
began a nearly three-month series of catastrophic events that would later be
recognized as the largest environmental disaster in American history
(Lustgarten, 2012). The lives of eleven people as well as almost five million
barrels of oil were lost. Blame for the event was placed on a myriad of factors
– from freak occurrences to corporate greed. An internal survey of rig workers
serving on the Deepwater Horizon showed that, “Many workers on the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig were concerned about safety in the weeks before
the 20 April explosion but feared reprisals if they reported problems,”(Kollewe,
2010). In the confidential survey, workers raised concerns that rig equipment
was unreliable, “Which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking
precedence over planned maintenance,” (Urbina, 2010).
While the measurement of public perception in the days following the
Deepwater Horizon disaster have been covered in other bodies of research,
such pre-event perception that was measured in the aforementioned survey
of employees should be applied to the community member’s affected by
events such as the Deepwater Horizon. This research marks an effort to
1

analyze how informed, via official online media, of risk Louisianans were prior
to the events of April 20th, 2010. Was much of the risk of offshore drilling
purposefully withheld, improperly communicated according to risk
communication theory principles, or simply unknown to British Petroleum
officials? It is the researcher’s intention to illustrate a connection between
corporate interest and poor risk communication strategies employed preincident. Special emphasis has been placed on the use of technical language,
a byproduct of a risk society reliant upon industry experts as communicators
(Giddons, 1991), and the evolution of BP’s online resources after the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW: COMMUNICATION IN THE RISK SOCIETY

To illustrate BP’s role within risk society and as conveyers of risk
communication, literature detailing the qualities of risk society purveyors and
the qualities of effective risk communication has been reviewed. The rise of
offshore drilling in the 1980’s allowed for the framing of risk society
cornerstones as they relate to Reagan-era neoliberal ideology. Texts from the
study of risk communication have been reviewed to provide an assessment of
BP’s specific strength and weakness as risk communicators within the risk
society.

RISK SOCIETY

Both the human health and environmental dangers posed by modern
day oil extraction technologies are a product of a risk society, a sociological
concept asserting that our contemporary society and its continued economic
growth is inextricably linked with unprecedented hazards and risks (Beck,
1992). The reliance on technological tools within contemporary society,
represents a dichotomy from the risk our ancestors experienced. Prior to
World War II, humans were subjected to risks posed by the natural world such
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as floods and famine. In contrast, risk societies craft and take deliberate risks.
For members living in a such a society, the risk is endemic (Barbosa, 2009).
A cornerstone of risk society theory is that a citizen’s access to
information regarding hazards to the environment and human health are
restricted (Beck, 1992). While such information can be purposefully withheld
from citizens, such as cases of proprietary technology that is sheiled from the
public eye via embargos and patent law, much censorship of inherent risk is
unintentional as, “technologies require multiple specialized experts who
create abstract knowledge systems that are incomprehensible to the majority
of citizens,” (Giddens, 1991). In simpler terms, as technology and knowledge
trek forward at a quickening pace, “many are left behind, panting in ignorance,
increasingly unable to understand and control the machines on which they
depend,” (Barbosa, 2009).
This lack of understanding is fueled by an increased economic and
societal dependence upon specialized experts. These leaders in their
respective fields craft complex knowledge systems that are indecipherable by
the general population (Giddens, 1991). Workers bear the brunt of the risk
posed by technological progress. A former resident of Love Canal, New York,
a site considered to be one of the more egregious environmental events in
American history, expressed, “Communities perceive many flaws in risk
assessment. The first is who is being asked to take the risk and who is getting
the benefit. From a community’s perspective, risk assessments are ‘the risks
4

that someone else has chosen for you to take,” (Gibbs, 1994).
Beck (1991) suggests that, as a result, citizens have lost faith in the
institutions of modernity. Catastrophic events that occurred from a lack of
foresight and proper risk assessment performed by science and industry
elites have tainted public trust in them. While scientists weigh the distribution
of risks and errors as a part of technological expansion, many of the said risks
and errors are created by science itself (Barbosa, 2009). For example, while
nuclear power technology has become a reality, the same scientists who
helped to mold the technology into its usable form have weighed potential
risks and expressed to the public that said technology is safe. As citizens are
forced to rely upon these scientific institution’s experts for vital information,
events such as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters have sown
distrust of industry officials (Barbosa, 2009).
The architect of risk society theory argues that, “the more emphatically
the existence of world risk society is denied, the more easily it can become a
reality,” (Beck, 2006). Therefore, it is crucial to produce and distribute
accurate risk assessments quantify so that effective policies can be
formulated. The oil extraction industry is a prominent risk society participant
because of its expansive production of toxic substances on which
contemporary society depends.

5

This research analyzes the communication of potential risks that
preceded the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Risk society markers in the
technology and practices of offshore drilling will be highlighted, and media
practices and the dissemination of risk information to the public will be
audited.

NEOLIBERALISM AS A FUEL FOR RISK SOCIETY

The ideology of neoliberalism asserts that, “human well-being can best
be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within and
institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual
liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade,” (Harvey, 2007). Scholars
critical of neoliberalism point to dangerous deregulation and resulting crises,
such as the 1987 stock market crash, and the numerous corporate scandals
of the 1990s (Marino, Mayper, and Tolleson).
Almost half a century before the Reagan era of neoliberalism took
shape, political economist Karl Polanyi predicted that, “to allow the market
mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural
environment would result in the demolition of society.” (1944, p. 76) Seventy
years after Polanyi’s prediction, sociologist Charles Perrow deemed that such
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fears had come to fruition as, “we have moved from public oversight to a
system wherein regulators cooperate with the regulated,” (2015, p. 203).
Over the last three decades, the United States, “has retreated from its
regulatory responsibility over private-sector economic activities,” (Perrow,
2015, p. 203). In the 2000’s alone, government deregulation was blamed for
events ranging from West Virginia’s Upper Big Branch mine explosion to
declining work conditions for air traffic controllers that have resulted in the
loss of human lives (Eley, 2011).

Consumers are protected via a common form of risk communication,
that which, “provide(s) labels and other information for informing consumers
about product risks and safe use practices,” (Baram, 1985, ). In determining if
risk communication practices performed by a company are within legal
boundaries, “Certain criteria favorable to persons at risk are used in the courts
to determine if company communication practices were adequate…” (Baram,
1985, p. 38). More specifically, the greater potential for harm that a
company’s practices or products presents, “the more precise, clear, and
obvious the warning must be to be found adequate,” (Baram, 1985, p. 39).
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RISK COMMUNICATION

Successful dissemination of information within the realm of risk
communication theory is described as that which, “raises the level of
understanding of relevant issues or actions for those involved and satisfies
them that they are adequately informed within the limits of available
knowledge,” (Improving Risk Communication, 1989). Several federal laws
outlaw corporation’s responsibility in properly implementing risk
communication, from emergency planning and community right-to-know to
environmental justice in minority populations (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004).
To evaluate a text’s ability to raise the level of understanding of a
content consumer, researchers studying risk communication through content
analysis, “Identify themes within a dataset and comparing those themes to the
study purpose and existing literature,” (Penney et al, 2011). For the purpose
of this research, Penney et al’s 2011 research on risk communication and
informed consent served as a basis for the risk communication terms selected
for content analysis.
Theories of risk communication cover communication methods both
preemptive in nature and those that result from questions arising from
communities, politicians, and activists concerned about potential ill effects of
industry. In the event that risk is not properly communicated by industry
8

officials, “health, safety and environmental concerns remain at the forefront of
media, community and public policy discussions,” (Palenchar and Heath,
2006).

As risk society theory claims that information is restricted due complex
knowledge systems created by experts in a given field, the scientific
positivism element of risk communication echoes this sentiment, “data and
methodologies of scientists dominate community efforts to ascertain the
degree of risk and subsequent communications about the risk on behalf of the
community,” (Renn, 1992). According to the US Environmental Protection
Agency (1993), “empowering the public with information helps assure
[industry] compliance with existing laws and encourages companies to take
additional measures to reduce industrial chemical releases.”
Study in the field of risk communication often resides in one of two
paradigms that assert, “whether risk is a technical matter that is determined
objectively or a social construction that emerges from communication among
experts, affected parties, and public agencies,” (Cox, 2006). The former
perspective, known as the technical model of risk, is criticized for its emphasis
on communication deemed, “too often restricted to a technical sphere and
thus excludes those who are most effected,” (Cox, 2006). The architect of
Risk Society theory, Ulrich Beck encapsulated the problems with a solely
technical approach to risk by stating, “there is a big difference between those
9

who take risks and those who are victimized by the risks others take,” (Beck,
1998). As risk society theory claims that information is restricted due complex
knowledge systems created by experts in a given field, the scientific
positivism element of risk communication echoes the sentiment that, “data
and methodologies of scientists dominate community efforts to ascertain the
degree of risk and subsequent communications about the risk on behalf of the
community,” (Renn, 1992).

In response to the technical domination of risk communications, the
cultural-experiential model was formed. This model deviates from the
technical model of risk in that it seeks to highlight, “attention to the
experiences of a community that might be left out of technical calculations,”
(Cox, 2006). Communications in this vein take into account familiar and often
personal concerns within its language forgoing technical information that may
be difficult to understand for the general population. Researchers of risk
communication note that this model allows for, “requests of information
regarding the experience and views of impacted populations and their
assessment of risk,” (Caron and Serrell, 2009).
These models provide an important lens through which to view content
analyses of risk communication texts. By performing counts of technical
language use, industry-specific terms, and overall complex language
appropriate for high-reading level adults, risk communicator can be mapped
10

as conformers of the technical model of risk communication or the cultural
model. Risk communication researchers have stated that industries who are
communicating risk to the general public will find more effective avenues of
communication via the cultural model than the technical model of risk
communication (Cox, 2006). With this knowledge, organizations can make a
conscious effort to adopt language changes that are more understood by their
audience.

BP AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE RENEGADE REFINER

British Petroleum’s foray into offshore drilling began in 1964 with the
conversion of a barge into an offshore drilling rig named Sea Gem. Anchored
42 miles off the shores of Britain, this platform was projected to tap into 10
million cubic feet of oil, “enough to supply the fuel needs of a town of 300,000
people,” (Britain: Sinking of the Sea Gem, 1996). Two years into operation the
rig collapsed resulting in the total loss of the platform and the death of 13
crew members (On this day: Sea Gem oil rig collapses, n.d.).
The sinking of Sea Gem, as well as the subsequent sinking and spills
of other company’s rigs, led to a tightening of internal safety and technical
policies within the realm of explosion protection, management and
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administration, rescue, and rig construction (Pickering, 1994). Despite initial
resistance from BP to adopt a statuary safety code for their offshore drilling
rigs, the exploration of factors contributing to Sea Gem’s demise softened
BP’s opposition to policy recommendations put forth by a British government
inquiry committee (Kemp, 2014).
Though the loss of BP’s first offshore drilling rig was a major financial
and loss of legal freedom for the company, the development was already
underway to begin the operation of BP’s second offshore drilling rig as crews
began clearing the wreckage of Sea Gem (TIME, 1996).
Today BP can no longer be found off the shore of their home country
but instead in Alaska, the US lower 48, and the Gulf of Mexico, currently
home to eight BP owned and/or operated rigs (Exploration and Production,
2017). With American shores promising a greater delivery upon investment
due to the presence of large oil deposits, BP’s exploration of the United
State’s crude oil extraction potential has proved mutually beneficial to the
coffers of both BP and the American government.
Outside of funds collected by the Internal Revenue Service, the
program leasing offshore oil resources has been the largest official source of
revenue for the American federal government (Freudenberg, 1994). Unlike oil
rich countries such as Iraq and Russia, free enterprise in the oil business
within the United States can be traced back to the earliest days of oil drilling in
the country. Not unlike other industries in America, the business of oil
12

extraction was heavily influenced by the wave of neoliberalism that began
cresting within the Regan presidency.
Much of the current oversight of offshore oil drilling in the early 2000s
was performed by the Mineral Management Service (MMS), an agency
created during the Regan presidency and headed by secretary of the interior,
James Watt, one of the most anti-environmental political appointees in
American history (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). British Petroleum, now
known as BP, was accused of showing influence within the MMS having
convinced agency officials that the oil companies themselves could best
asses the marine impacts of their operations as well as persuading regulators
to ease existing public notification rules (Ladd, 2012). Within the 2010 MMS
annual report, released before the events of Deepwater Horizon, it was
concluded that more stringent rig regulations were superfluous given that
industry practices were considered failsafe (Kennedy, 2010; Whitty, 2010).
A commission name by President Obama to investigate the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill noted that, “MMS became an agency systematically lacking
the resources, technical training or experience in petroleum engineering that
is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore drilling is being conducted in a
safe and responsible manner,” (Report to the President, 2011). The Obama
administration retooled the MMS in October of 2011 to become the Bureau of
Ocean Management, Regulation and Enforcement. Critics were quick to note
13

that changes to the organization were, “only cosmetic changes and remains
too close to the people it is supposed to regulate,” (Broder and Krauss, 2011).
BP’s ability to directly influence political elites became even more clear
after Vice President Dick Cheney, within months of taking office, “held secret
energy task force meetings with more than 100 oil officials to draw up a wish
list of industry demands to be implemented by the oil-friendly administration,”
(Ladd, 2012). Shortly afterward, a federal executive order set forth a
requirement that the federal government was to expedite offshore drilling
practices (Bolstad, 2010). Within this atmosphere of deregulation, BP
garnered a reputation among OSHA officials as being, “the Renegade
Refiner,” (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011, p. 42).

From 2008 until the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, oil and gas
companies spent more than $340 million on lobbying efforts in congress. BP
CEO Tony Hayward increased his company’s lobbying budget to $15.9 million
in 2009 specifically in order to dilute new laws aimed at preventing oil spill
pollution (Kocieniewski, 2010; Whitty, 2010).
A decade before the Deepwater Horizon spill, Ulrich Beck (2002)
predicted that, “in the world of global risks, the mark of neoliberalism rapidly
loses its credibility to substitute the state and politics through economics.” The
era of neoliberalism has ushered in a state of deregulation. Within the wake of
14

loosening and removal of federal regulations of offshore drilling has come the
increase of risk, and ultimately, the loss of lives. When reviewing the events of
the Deepwater Horizon spill, it is important to note that deregulation has
largely influenced the level of risk that the communities and workers of
offshore drilling have and are continuing to be exposed to.

THE EVENTS OF DEEPWATER HORIZON

The Deepwater Horizon explosion occurred after a three decades of
neoliberal policies and approaches to offshore drilling. According to the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling (2010), “Technology, law, and geology pushed oil exploration farther
from U.S. shores, as land-based exploration became less fruitful, and the
global demand for energy ramped up.”
It is estimated that the Deepwater Horizon spilled 4.9 million barrels of
crude oil and natural gases were released into the waters forty-one miles off
of Louisiana’s coast. In the days following the spill, responders, scientists, and
BP itself would acknowledge the spill as the largest environmental disaster in
American history (Nyankson, Rodene, and Gupta, 2015). Eleven workers
were killed aboard the rig, sixteen others sustained serious injuries, and three
15

months passed before the leaking oil could be capped enough to prevent
further damage to the environment (National Academy of Engineering, 2012).
A qualitative interview analysis of 139 Louisiana residents showed that
nearly 50% of locals felt that they lacked information about the Deepwater
Horizon spill (Simon-Friedt, et al, 2016). It is being proposed that further
research into the preemptive risk communication will shed light on patterns of
communication that may have left Louisianans underinformed about the
dangers of offshore drilling.
A content analysis of BP.com will be utilized to uncover weaknesses
and discrepancies in the risk communicated to community members and
workers prior to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Special attention will be
given to language concerning risk that is rich in scientific jargon and are
written for high reading level adults as opposed to the general population. It is
questioned whether much of the risk communication emanating from BP’s
online sources were largely too complex in nature to adequately inform the
general populous about risks relating to offshore drilling.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS AND MATERIALS

Content analysis has become a common methodology for assessing
risk communication practices. The methodology is defined by, “a domain of
techniques designed to explore and describe qualitative verbal, written, and
multimedia communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative
manner,” (Crano, Brewer, and Lac, 2015). Said methodology is commonly
relied upon in the study of risk communication practices due to its ability to
yield a variety of symbolic cues and shared themes within the human
experience of accessing and evaluating risk information (Palenchar and
Heath, 2002).
Given the presence of existing literature employing content analysis of
websites illustrating risk communication practices, the content analysis used
in this research employs the principles of deductive content analysis whereas
the researcher, “determined the coding categories and units that will be the
basis of the coding system prior to conducting the coding,” (Crano, Brewer,
and Lac, 2015).
Coding categories in this research were supported by existing studies
of online risk communication that employed content analysis, such as Penney
et al’s 2011 study of risk communication and informed consent. Using past
17

studies’ categories as a basis for determining risk communication categories
to target for content analysis, ten risk communication items were targeted for
this research:
• Reference to offshore drilling: language illustrating the use of offshore
drilling techniques, the building and maintaining of offshore rigs, and
exploration of offshore oil deposits
• Explicit reference to environmental sustainability: such specific
targeting of language prevents the incorporation of mentions of
sustainability as it relates to development and finances
• Evidence of professional membership or certification
• Explicit reference to safety
• Explicit reference to cleanups
• Mention of human health risks
• Mention of environmental risks: language illustrating the mitigation of
potential dangers to the environment
• Reference to reporting requirements
• Reference to adherence with law
• Industry specific terms: language that is technical in nature and is
specific to the energy industry
In addition to the content analysis framed by the aforementioned
categories, this research also gauged the effectiveness of BP’s online risk
communication practices by employing the mathematical equation known as
the Flesch Reading Ease Score. This score is described as, “a test designed
to assess the comprehension and difficulty of reading passages of
contemporary academic English,” (Kong and Hu, 2015). According to
Henderson et al (2015), “Previous research indicates that online health
information tends to be written at a reading level that is more advanced than
ability of the general population.” Louisiana in particular has been reported to
18

have the one of the lowest reading proficiencies in the United States (BaconBlood, 2013). Though urban populations have shown higher reading
proficiency than rural populations (Graham and Teague, 2011), 2015 data
showed that within the Greater New Orleans area alone, “nearly 40 percent of
the population aged 16 and older have a literacy rate below that of a 5thgrader,” (Facts and Statistics, 2016).
Use of the Flesch Reading Ease Score formula provides insight to the
appropriateness and reliability of the language used on BP’s website. The
formula provides a score on a scale of 0 to 100 where the higher the score,
the more easily readable the text. The architects of the formula describe a
score of 0 as unreadable and a score of 100 representing language use easily
understood for a literate individual, (Flesch, 1948). This score is determined
by the following equation:
Readability ease = 206.835 – (1.015 x Average Sentence Length) – (84.6 x
Average numbers of syllables per word)

According to Flesch (1946), scores between 90 and 100 are
appropriate for those at or above a fifth grade reading level. Scores between
60 and 70 are easily understood by individuals of middle school age. Finally,
scores of 30 and below illustrates a reading level appropriate for college
graduates.
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Three iterations of BP’s website were analyzed for risk communication
language. A digital library hosted through the non-profit Internet Archive
allowed the researcher to view the BP.com website in its original form on
selected dates, specific categories of language based on other studies of risk
communication effectiveness were identified and catalogued. The iterations
chosen for this research were BP’s archived website of
• October 20th, 1996, the earliest available archive of BP.com
• April 15th, 2010, five days after the Deepwater Horizon spill
• April 5th, 2016
Each of the website’s pages relevant to the analyzation of risk
communication were analyzed according to the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease
Score formula. Each page of BP.com under the sections of Environment and
Safety was tabulated for average sentence length, average number of
syllables per word, and targeted content analysis categories were tallied.
Flesch reading scores were averaged together representing the readability of
risk focused pages for each year’s iteration of the website.
Only content that was available via the HTML website was analyzed,
not taking into account downloadable documents such as PDFs and graphs.
These document remained outside of the scope of research as the
documents were often technical and financial in nature, thus falling outside
the interest of the general patron of the website seeking information about the
environment, human health, and offshore drilling. Additionally, such
20

documents are frequently unavailable via internet archives unlike HTML
snapshots. Furthermore, only featured pages such as those that could be
accessed from main landing pages were not targeted in the content analysis.

BP ONLINE

According to web archives, BP unveiled its website to the public in
autumn of 1996 (Web Archive, 1996). This first iteration of the company’s
online presence was typical of other websites of the time containing few page
links and no embedded video. Despite only containing six hyperlinks to pages
on the website, information on health and safety were present on day one of
BP’s existence on the information super highway. Under the main tab of What
We Care About were four hyperlinks of related material labeled, Policies,
People, the Community, and Health, Safety, and the Environment. Though
BP’s foray into offshore drilling began long before their foray into cyberspace,
no mention of offshore drilling is mentioned in the content located via these
hyperlinked headings. However, in this 1996 iteration of the website there is
an acknowledgement that, “we aim to reduce total oil discharge to water,
despite increased drilling activity and continued reservoir depletion,”
(Environmental Performance, 1996).
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Several large scale oil spills occurred between the 1996 iteration of
BP.com and the 2010 iteration. In 2007 when a new Chief Executive of BP
settled a series of criminal charges related to these events, the company
issued a statement pledging to improve their risk management (Mouawad,
2010).
From 1996 until 2005, visitors to BP’s website could not be transported
via hyperlink to pages about offshore drilling or oil spills directly from the
homepage as illustrated in figure 1. It is in this 2005 version of the BP website
that the What We Care About heading was transformed into a homepage
heading titled Environment and Society indicating an effort to better showcase
sustainability and safety specifics. This organization of pages and headings
closely resembles the modern day website as it forms narratives around
safety and sustainability concerns. Before the 2005 update, users of BP’s
website could find letters by BP executives rather than specific information
about ongoing offshore drilling projects as well as environmental and health
policies relating to offshore drilling.
Though the language concerning risk became more complex as
BP.com evolved from 1999 to 2016, it should be noted that the website
offered more non-text information about risk with each iteration of the website.
In 1996, BP.com featured no video on the pages targeted by this research. By
2010, BP.com featured numerous pieces of video content on the subjects of
human health and environmental risk, as well as hyperlinks to company social
22

media accounts such as YouTube. While literature on the efficacy of risk
communication presented through text versus video is limited, recent
research suggests that video can improve individuals understanding and
retaining of information about risks (Garg et al, 2012).
Notably missing on BP.com days after the spill was information specific
to community members within the immediate impact zone of the oil spill. This
would be remedied in the summer of 2010 with the addition of website content
that allowed visitors to file claims for damages. The summer 2010 version of
BP.com also featured a list of emergency hotlines, a section that is not
featured on the risk communication relevant portions of the website iterations
analyzed in this research.

ASSESSING RISK COMMUNICATION WITHIN BP

Palenchar and Heath (2006) claim that, “organizations find reason to
implement programs whereby they increase publics’ understanding of
technical processes as a means for lessening the fear of the threatening
unknown and of increasing trust.” While a myriad of qualitative risk analyses
has been performed on the technical systems within projects such as the
Deepwater Horizon and said event itself, “much less attention has been
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focused on the human and organizational (sic) factors,” (Skodalen & Vinnem,
2016).
From a post-spill perspective, BP’s communication of risk has been
analyzed according to federal and state regulations, most notable among
these, the Emergency Planning and Communication Right-to-know Act
(EPCRA). The act is described by the Environmental Protection Agency as
having, “a significant role in protecting human health and the environment
over the last quarter century by providing communities and emergency
planners with valuable information on toxic chemical releases in their area,”
(30 Years of EPCRA, 2016). After being sued by the Center for Biological
Diversity, a federal judge ruled that BP and Transocean, the owners of the rig
itself, were not required to communicate risk as dictated by EPCRA due to
language excluding spills comprised of petroleum (Rodriguez, 2015).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been a leading
resource for risk communication and emergency response planning (Baram,
1985). Despite their initiatives, online EPA documents about risk
communication provides recommendations for practitioners but do not define
risk communication as it adheres to federal law aside from corporate
responsibility to draft contingency plans for environmental risks, (Guidance
Documents, n.d.).
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The contingency plan for BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig was approved by
the EPA and was reviewed as recently as one year before the catastrophe.
The 582 page document was later noted as being riddled with oversights and
errors. When documenting area wildlife for the gulf water habitat surrounding
the rig, the contingency plan erroneously listed animals not present in the
biosphere, such as sea lions and walruses (Clark, 2010). Additionally the plan
listed, “a Long-deceased scientist as a recommended expert on wildlife
contamination,” (Clark, 2010).
The document described spills much more catastrophic than what
occurred at Deepwater Horizon, yet made the false statement that even
events that size, “fish, marine mammals and birds escape serious harm;
beaches remain pristine; water quality is only a temporary problem,” (BP
Contingency Plans Vastly Inadequate, 2010). Despite this claim, wildlife was
reported as being severely impacted and oil reached the shores of Florida
within days of the spill (Clark, 2010).
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Content analysis of BP.com on selected dates in 1999, 2010, and 2016
was performed via coding in ten categories of risk community as it related to
both human health and environmental sustainability. 246 targeted terms were
identified on BP.com in 1996, with the greatest number of mentions relating to
language consistent with the description of environmental risks. 456 targeted
terms were accounted for in the 2010 iteration of BP.com with the most
numerous targeted items representing language that illustrated environmental
risk. 396 terms were identified on the 2016 BP.com website with the most
numerous robust coding category consisting of language describing oil spills.
These items were illustrated for reference in Figure 2.
Each page was analyzed using the Flesch Reading Score Formula. As
seen in Figure 3, the average score for each targeted website version was
38.5 for 1996, 36.9 for 2010, and 29.8 in 2016.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While it may be assumed that BP’s approach to risk communication
has evolved after being implicit in the largest oil spill in history, as sociologist
William Freudenburg (1997) states, “…if we do our jobs sufficiently well, our
points should indeed be obvious, at least in retrospect. One of the surest
signs that we have been clear in our explanations is when a phenomenon
becomes obvious through our efforts.” The analysis of targeted risk content in
this research suggests that increased clarity has not been a byproduct of BP’s
evolution in cyberspace.
The average Flesch-Kincaid Reading Score of targeted BP.com pages
illustrate growing complexity of language with each subsequent iteration of
the website. As seen in Figure 2, pages related to community health and
environmental sustainability on the 1996 version of BP.com rated at a FleschKincaid Reading Score of 38.5. This score for similar pages present on the
website days after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill rated at 36.9. The score
for BP.com in 2016 was the lowest of the three with an average FleschKincaid Reading score of 29.8. According to ratings developed by Flesch
(1946), each of these score represent language appropriate that would be
best understandable by college graduates.
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Half of individuals within the immediate impact zone of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill claimed in a qualitative survey that they felt underinformed
about the risks posed to their community (Simon-Friedt, et al, 2016). Should
these individuals have accessed BP.com to get more information about
human health and environmental risks, they would have faced content that
was written far above the average reading level of the average citizen (Facts
and Statistics, 2016). As seen in Figure 3, the iterations of BP.com crafted
years after the spill have only increased in the complexity of its language
according to this research.
Community members within the immediate impact zone of the
Deepwater Horizon that visited BP’s website would have found only 7 specific
references to offshore drilling on the safety, community, and environmental
sustainability sections website. Only two utterances of language regarding oil
spill cleanups were detected in the content analysis. While these numbers
have grown in updates to the websites, Louisianan’s had very limited access
to relevant risk information in the days following the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill.
In January 2017, the EPA released new regulations under their Risk
Management Program (RMP). In sum, “The RMP rule requires facilities that
use extremely hazardous substances to develop Risk Management Plans,”
(Cave, 2017). As part of these plans, corporations will comply with risk
communication regulation that will, “require the owner or operator of a
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stationary source to distribute certain chemical hazard information for all
regulated processes to the public in an easily accessible manner, such as on
a company website,” (Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 2017).
The regulations, put into action just days before the inauguration of President
Donald Trump, face an uncertain future as Trump appointed EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt has been critical of said regulations in the past,
(Cave, 2017). Should the Trump administration, known for its emphasis on
deregulation, it may represent a lack of growth in terms of risk communication
in the oil industry.
With the EPA currently facing budget cuts of 31% (Dennis and Eilperin,
2017), regulatory rollbacks that may occur via this administration will remain
of interest to risk communication scholars. When new technologies intersect
with deregulation, it is necessary to analyze environmental and human health
mishaps when they occur in the future. How and why the risk surrounding
these events should continue to be compared to past successes and failures
in risk communication.
Communication within a Risk Society is defined by, “complex
knowledge systems that are indecipherable by the general population,”
(Giddens, 1991). The increase in language complexity on BP.com illustrates a
growing consistency with the parameters of the theory of Risk Society. When
Polanyi (1944) stated that the allowing of market mechanisms to be the
director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment would be
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the downfall of society, he was speaking of the same forces of deregulation
that allow companies such as BP to stay silent, or opaque on matters of risk.
It is inevitable that another disaster resulting in the loss of human life
and the loss of environmental integrity will occur after the publishing of this
research. When such an event unfolds, it is the responsibility of industry, the
public, the media, watchdog groups, and the United States government to
reflect on the responsibility to better preemptively communicate risk
surrounding contemporary technologies. The case study of Deepwater
Horizon illustrates that neoliberal policies that allow companies such as BP to
police themselves in providing risk communication perpetuates the Risk
Society, a world that provides increasingly diminishing returns for both society
and the biotic realm.
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Figure 1: Archived images of BP.com via the Internet Archive, 1996, 2005, and
2017 homepages
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